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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 
OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
Kevin C. Kennedyt 
As the millennium approaches, the Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse-War, Famine, Pestilence, and Death-still 
ride defiantly across the face of the planet. From Central 
America to Southeast Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, and to 
Europe and Africa in the 1990s, war has been a seemingly 
constant fixture of everyday life. Cholera struck thousands in 
Peru and Bangladesh in 1991 and threatened many more. 
Thousands worldwide have fallen victim to acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome. But millions more since the end of World 
War II have been visited by the cruelest of all the Four 
Horsemen, Famine. Cruelest because Famine works the slowest, 
affects more people, and kills with a horrible efficiency as 
good as his brother riders. 
According to recent World Bank studies, the number of 
persons suffering from chronic malnutrition is estimated be-
tween 340 million and 730 million, excluding China. 1 This is 
the case even though overall food production has grown faster 
than population in developing countries. In the World Bank's 
view, the root cause of malnutrition and famine is not in-
sufficient food production, but poverty and uneven distribution 
of income.2 The short prescription for alleviating hunger, there-
fore, is to increase growth and the competitiveness of an 
economy, a conclusion reached by Adam Smith more than 200 
years ago when he wrote in The Wealth of Nations that "a 
famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence 
of government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the 
t Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. J.D., Wayne State University 
School of Law, 1977; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1982. 
1. Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options jor Food Security in Deve/oping 
Countries (1986), WORLD BANK, WORLD DEV. REp. 1986, at 7 (1986) [hereinafter 
Poverty and Hunger]. 
2. Id. 
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inconveniences [sic] of a dearth."3 For most of the world's 
developing countries, that means pursuing reform of those 
economic policies in the agricultural sector that retard the 
growth of agricultural output. 
The direct cause of famine and malnutrition is not always 
inadequate income. Take the case of Ethiopia. Plagued by 
intermittent droughts and thirty years of civil war, Ethiopians 
experienced terrible famine and malnutrition as a direct con-
sequence.4 Even if they had had the income to buy imported 
food, rebel and government troops would have slowed or 
interdicted its distribution. And, of course, the people do not 
have the income in the first place to purchase imported food 
because they depend on agriculture for their livelihood, an 
occupation they cannot pursue either because of the drought 
or because of the war which forced them to flee their farms. 
The plight of developing countries is not entirely of their 
own making nor that of Mother Nature. In its 1986 World 
Development Report, the World Bank concluded that 
trade barriers in industrial countries have become more restrictive, 
and most developing countries pursue policies that inhibit the growth 
of agricultural output and of rural incomes. As a result, most of 
the world's food exports are grown in industrial countries, where 
the costs of food production are high, and consumed in developing 
ones, where the costs are lower. S 
Distressingly, calls for protectionism from the agricultural 
industry within the developed countries have not subsided. 
Protectionism in the agricultural sector has derailed the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, where the United States, with 
3.5 million farmers, and the Cairns Group (Canada, Australia, 
Brazil, Argentina, and a handful of developing countries) want 
domestic farm subsidies lowered by 750/0 and export subsidies 
slashed by 90% over ten years. The European Community 
(BC), with ten million farmers, has refused to budge from a 
3. 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 526 (Roy H. Campbell & Andrew 
S. Skinner eds., 1976). 
4. Robert M. Press, Ethiopians Promise Priority to Food Relief, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, May 30, 1991, at 5. 
5. Poverty and Hunger, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
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30070 reduction in domestic subsidies. In Japan, the domestic 
rice market remains completely closed to imports.6 Considering 
that agricultural trade represents approximately only 10070 of 
total world trade, the intransigence of the EC and Japan on 
this issue is a case of the tail wagging the dog. Back at home, 
as free trade negotiations between the United States and Mexico 
have concluded, Florida farmers have asked that winter fruit 
and vegetables be exempted from any free trade agreement.7 
California tomato growers have asked that the agreement be 
phased-in over twenty years,S double the ten year time period 
allowed for the elimination of tariffs under the U.S.-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement. 
By one estimate, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) member countries paid over $200 
billion, and perhaps as much as $300 billion, in 1990 in 
agricultural subsidies and artificially high consumer food prices.9 
In Canada, for example, the regulation of food products such 
as chickens, eggs, and dairy products, whose prices are set by 
marketing boards, cost twice as much as the same products 
in the United States. 10 In the United States, the blatantly 
protectionist Export Enhancement Program (EEP) masquerades 
as a free trade measure. In 1989, $2.5 billion in commodity 
bonuses were paid under the EEP, boosting the sale of $8.5 
billion in agricultural products to sixty-five countries. ll In the 
face of congressional charges that the EEP is little more than 
a handout to grain exporting companies, an Undersecretary of 
Agriculture defended the EEP as a challenge to the unfair 
trade practices of competitors that would pressure them to 
6. Japan Ready to Listen to GAIT Proposals But Will Stand Behind Rice 
Market Curbs, [Jan.-June] 7 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) No. 20, at 701 (May 16, 
1990). 
7. Scott Armstrong & Daniel B. Wood, U.S. Farmers Wary of a Trade Pact 
with Mexicans, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 28, 1991, at 1-2. 
8. [d. 
9. Scott Pendelton, Officials Upbeat on GA IT Talks, CHRIsTIAN SCI. MON-
'ITOR, May 28, 1991, at 8. See WORLD BANK-DE CD STUDY CITES BENEFITS OF 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LmERALIZATION, [Jan.-June] 7 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) No. 
21, at 738 (May 23, 1990). 
10. Fred Langan, Canadians Flocking to U.S. Shops, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
May 29, 1991, at 7. 
11. USDA, GAO Tell Senate Panel EEP Program Should Continue as Effective 
Trade Tool, [Jan.-June] 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.9, at 291 (Feb. 28, 1990). 
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negotiate the reduction of trade barriers that injure American 
farmers. 12 
In the Uruguay Round the United States' opening "zero 
option" position that all agricultural subsidies be eliminated 
eventually softened to one of eliminating all export subsidies 
and 90070 of all domestic farm subsidies over ten years, with 
"tariffication" of all other non-tariff trade barriers.13 In the 
United States, the American Farm Bureau Federation supported 
the U.S. proposal,14 while the National Association of State 
Departments of Agriculture remained skeptical whether the 
reform proposal would benefit U.S. farmers in the long run. IS 
In Australia, the Australian National Farmers' Federation 
launched an initiative to speed agricultural reform along on 
the Uruguay Round agenda.16 A 1990 OECD/World Bank 
estimate is that if developed countries cease granting farm and 
export subsidies, food prices would rise resulting in a shift of 
food production to lower-wage developing countries, with a 
net annual economic gain to OECD countries of approximately 
$50 billion and $12 billion to developing countriesY 
With so much evidence existing to support the view that 
tremendous gains can be reaped from liberalizing agricultural 
trade, why has there been and why does there continue to be 
so much resistance to proposals for reform, especially from 
the EC and Japan? How did we get where we are today? Why 
is the EC so intransigent on the issue of reforming its extremely 
expensive $9 billion annual Common Agricultural Policy? Why 
does Japan keep its rice market closed to imports? Let's first 
take a brief look at the question of why the agricultural sector 
has escaped basic GATT disciplines, and then consider the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
12. Id. 
13. State Farm Commissioners Express Skepticism at u.S. Uruguay Round 
Trade Reform Proposal, [Jan.-June] 7 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) No.3, at 361, 
(Mar. 14, 1990) [hereinafter State Farm]. 
14. Farm Bureau Reaffirms Support for U.S. GATT Plan, But Uncertain at 
Changes for Success, [Jan.-June] 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 73 (Jan. 
17, 1990). 
15. State Farm, supra note 13. 
16. Australian Farmers' Federation Launches Initiative to Speed Uruguay Round 
Talks, [Jan.-June] 7 INT'L TRADE REp. (BNA) No. 20, at 700 (May 16, 1990). 
17. UNITED NATION CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS, 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LmERALIZATION IN THE URUGUAY ROUND: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1990). 
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1. GATT AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
In its basic design, GATT reflects liberal trade principles to 
which contracting parties agree to adhere, even if that means 
that contracting parties must amend their domestic trade leg-
islation to accommodate GATT rules. In the case of agricultural 
trade, however, this fundamental design was turned on its 
head: The GATT rules for agricultural trade were written largely 
by the United States to accommodate U.S. domestic agricultural 
policy.18 This accommodation resulted in a major departure 
from two GATT disciplines: (1) the general prohibition against 
imposing quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports (quotas); 
and (2) the prohibition against granting export subsidies except 
under specific conditions.19 In the case of QRs, Article XI:2(c) 
permits quotas on agricultural imports provided the import 
quotas are part of a government program that also restricts 
domestic production of the like product or removes a temporary 
surplus of the like product.20 In the case of export subsidies, 
Article XVI in essence exempts agricultural products from 
GATT disciplines with regard to such subsidies. Although Ar-
ticle XVI is an admittedly weak restraint on the use of export 
18. DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GAIT: REWRITING THE RULES 
103-04 (Inst. for Int'l Econ., 1987). 
19. Two kinds of subsidies exist under international trade law, export subsidies 
and domestic subsidies. Export subsidies, as the name suggests, is a government 
payment conditioned on the export of a designated product or on export per-
formance. A domestic subsidy is a government assist on the production or man-
ufacture of a product without regard to its ultimate destination. See Kevin C. 
Kennedy, An Examination oj Domestic Subsidies and the Standard jor Imposing 
Countervailing Duties, 9 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 1, 2 n.lO (1986); John 
Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping Ajter the Tokyo Round, 
13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 261 (1980). 
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI:2(c), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-H, T.LA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAIT]. Article XI:2(c) 
provides in part: 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article [generally prohibiting 
quotas and import licenses] shall not extend to the following: 
* * * * (c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported 
in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures -which 
operate: 
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like product permitted to be marketed 
or produced • .. or 
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product •... 
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subsidies in the first place,21 paragraphs 2 and 3 strongly counsel 
against their use. Paragraph 2 provides: 
The contracting parties recognize that the granting of a subsidy 
on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other 
contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause undue 
disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder 
the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement. 
Paragraph 3 continues this theme with the general admo-
nition, but not command, against the use of export subsidies 
for "primary" products (Le., products of farm, forest, or 
fisheries): "Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to 
avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products.22" 
But in the event that contracting parties are unable to resist 
the temptation and do provide export subsidies for primary 
products, paragraph 3 urges restraint: 
If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any 
form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any 
primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied 
in a manner which results in that contracting party having more 
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, 
account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such 
trade in the product during a previous representative period, and 
any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting 
such trade in the product. 
This "soft" GATT discipline on the use of export subsidies 
was partially hardened in 1979 in the seventh GATT round 
of multilateral trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round, which 
led to the negotiation of the GATT Subsidies Code.23 Under 
21. In the case of subsidized imports that cause injury to a domestic producer 
of the like product, article VI:3 & 6(a) permits the imposition of a countervailing 
duty to offset the government subsidy. GATT, at art. VI:3(a). 
22. [d. Article XVI defines a "primary product" to be "any product of farm, 
forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such 
processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial 
volume in international trade." GATT, art. XVI(B)(2). 
23. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and 
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTMI 
W/236 Subsidies, 26th Supp. BISD 56-83 (1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]. As 
of December 31, 1991, 24 countries had signed the Subsidies Code, including 
Canada, Japan, all the EC member countries, and the United States. See U.S. 
Int'l Trade Comm'n, Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 43d Report, at 
49 (USITC Pub. 2554 1992). 
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Article 9: 1 of the Subsidies Code, it was agreed that 
"[S]ignatories shall not grant export subsidies on products other 
than certain primary products." Once again, little progress was 
made on ending the use of subsidies to promote exports of 
agricultural products. In connection with export subsidies on 
agricultural products, Article 9 of the Subsidies Code narrowed 
the exemption by eliminating minerals from the definition of 
"primary products."24 Article 10 in turn reiterated the pro-
visions of Article XVI:3, and then went on to define the three 
critical terms in that original GATT article: (1) "equitable 
share of world export trade;" (2) "more than an equitable 
share of world export trade;" and (3) "a previous representative 
period. "25 
In short, while significant progress has been made in dis-
ciplining the use of export subsidies on non-primary products, 
neither GATT nor the Subsidies Code has brought any ap-
preciable discipline to the use of export subsidies in connection 
with primary products. With regard to quotas on imports of 
agricultural products, the problem of liberalizing agricultural 
trade was exacerbated in 1955 when the GATT Contracting 
Parties granted the United States a waiver permitting it to 
impose quotas on agricultural imports in a manner inconsistent 
with Article XI:2(c).26 One silver lining in this otherwise dark 
cloud is the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in which both 
countries agreed to a ban on export subsidies on agricultural 
24. Subsidies Code, art 9 n.29. 
25. Subsidies Code, art. 10:2. Article 10:2 provides: 
For purposes of article XVi:3 of the General Agreement: 
(a) "more than an equitable share of world export trade" shall include 
any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory 
is to displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind the de-
velopments on world markets; (b) with regard to new markets traditional 
patterns of supply of the product concerned to the world market, region 
or country, in which the new market is situated shall be taken into account 
in determining "equitable share of world export trade;" (c) "a previous 
representative period" shall normally be the three most recent calendar 
years in which normal market conditions existed. Id. 
26. Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection with Import Restrictions 
Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 
1933), As Amended, GAIT, 3d Supp. BISD 32 (1955). 
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trade inter sese,27 and a further commitment to work toward 
the elimination of all agricultural subsidies, both domestic and 
export, on a global basis.28 
The long and the short of it is that if agricultural trade is 
to be liberalized, GATT has to be reformed. What hurdles 
stand in the way of such reform? That question leads to an 
examination of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy and 
Japan's import quotas and bans on agricultural trade. 
II. THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP) 
The genesis of the CAP is the Treaty of Rome,29 which laid 
the foundation for a common agricultural policy in Articles 
38 and 39. Article 38 provides that the common market is to 
include agriculture and trade in agriculture, and that as a 
precondition to such inclusion the Member States are to es-
tablish a common agricultural policy. Article 39 in turn sets 
forth five objectives which the common agricultural policy is 
to meet: 
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical 
progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural 
production and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, 
in particular labor; 
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of 
persons engaged in agriculture; 
(c) to stabilize markets; 
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
(e) to ensure that supplies reach customers at reasonable prices. 
On this basic treaty foundation, the CAP has laid three 
cornerstones: (1) common prices for agricultural products in 
27. U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can. T.S. 1989 No.3, 
27 I.L.M. 281. 
28. Article 701:2 of the Free Trade Agreement provides that "[nleither Party 
shall introduce or maintain any export subsidy on any agricultural goods originating 
in, or shipped from, its territory that are exported directly or indirectly to the 
territory of the other Party." Article 701:1 provides that "[tlhe Parties agree that 
their primary goal with respect to agricultural subsidies is to achieve, on a global 
basis, the elimination of all subsidies which distort agricultural trade, and the Parties 
agree to work together to achieve this goal, including thorough multilateral trade 
negotiations such as the Uruguay Round." 
29. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
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all EC-member countries; (2) an absolute preference for EC 
producers over outside producers; and (3) common funding of 
agricultural programs through the EC Commission.30 The CAP 
is essentially a price-support mechanism, with substantial ex-
penditures (12070 of the 1987 EC budget) going for agricultural 
research and technological development. 31 The BC Commission 
uses a mechanism of variable import levies and export refunds 
to defend the threshold price that the Commission sets for EC 
farmers. The net effect of this system on imports is that 
imported products can never undersell the EC product. The 
variable import levy ensures that the price of the imported 
product, once the levy is assessed, is at or above the threshold 
price set for the EC product. Thus, variable import levies 
operate in much the same way as quotas: No matter how 
competitive third-country imports are, variable import levies 
assure that EC threshold prices cannot be undercut. 
With regard to EC agricultural exports, surplus is sold on 
the world market, and BC farmers are guaranteed a price equal 
to the threshold price through the use of export subsidies. 
When world prices are lower than the EC threshold price 
(which is generally the case), the EC farmer will not have to 
take a loss, the export subsidy will make up the difference. 
The net effect of the CAP has been to encourage overpro-
duction. The most significant adverse effects of CAP's price-
support policies come in two forms. The first is inflated food 
prices for EC consumers, who in effect shoulder the burden 
of a regressive income tax. The second is the encouragement 
of investment decisions that result in greater agricultural pro-
duction, but in the absence of sufficient demand to justify the 
increased production. One of the side effects of this overpro-
duction is environmental degradation and exhaustion of the 
land. The resulting surplus must in turn be destroyed or sold 
on world markets at below market prices. The agriculture 
industry in developing countries is harmed or destroyed because 
they cannot afford to compete with the subsidized EC exports. 
Worse still, when the United States gets into a bidding war 
30. Hathaway, supra note 18, at 72. 
31. AGRICULTURAL TRADE LmERALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 
(Secondo Tarditi et a1 eds., 1989). 
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with the Be over an agricultural export sale (say, for example, 
the sale of wheat to Pakistan),32 developing countries,33 as well 
as some developed countries like Australia, that are efficient 
food producers but who abstain from export subsidies, become 
the innocent bystanders· caught in the crossfire. 
III. JAPAN'S IMPORT QUOTAS AND BANS 
Japan's agricultural policy is driven mainly by its wartime 
legacy of food shortages, which has in turn led to a desire 
for food self-sufficiency. This desire for food self-sufficiency 
is reflected in Japan's ban on rice imports, a powerful symbol 
for the Japanese, but a major friction point in Japan's trade 
relations.34 Besides the ban on rice imports, Japan maintains 
import quotas on twenty-two agricultural items, applied mostly 
to final products rather than to raw materials.3S Japanese 
agricultural interests are very resistant to opening markets to 
products which they produce, and are able to exercise influence 
with the Japanese Diet greater than their numbers because of 
the disproportionate representation of rural voters in the Diet 
(not unlike the disproportionate influence of American farm 
interests in the U.S. Senate). Although Japan's agricultural 
policies have impacted food imports, as a net food importer 
its policies have not directly affected export markets.36 
IV. U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 
Although the United States is responsible for initiating this 
latest foray against farm subsidies, it did not enter the arena 
32. Catherine Foster, Australians Upset Again By US Wheat Sales, CHrusTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. IS, 1993, at 6; Ron Scherer, Australia's Productive Farmers 
Face Trade Barriers, CHrusTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 3, 1990, at 7. 
33. Masimba Tafrrenyika, Trade Practices Undercut African Agriculture, CHrus-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1992, at 19. 
34. See Hathaway, supra note 18, at 78-79; U.S. Will Push for End to Rice 
Bans in Japan and Korea, USDA '$ ESPY Says, [Jan.-June] 10 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) No.9, at 365 (Mar. 3, 1993); Clayton Jones, Japanese Farmers Get Ready 
for Sticky Competition from Foreign Rice, CHrusTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 1991, 
at 7; Amy Kaslow, Rice Trade Issue Divides Countries, CHrusTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
July 10, 1991, at 6; Clayton Jones, Japan Reluctant to Put Rice on Trade Table, 
CHrusTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 3, 1990, at 7. 
35. Hathaway, supra note 18, at 79. 
36. Id. at 80. 
HeinOnline -- 2 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 317 1993
1993] Agricultural Trade 317 
with clean hands. As noted, the present international legal 
regime governing agricultural trade reflected U.S. farm policy, 
a protectionist policy that involved a great deal of government 
intervention into the market. Through a haphazard system of 
price-support loans and deficiency payments made to farmers 
when the market price is less than a government mandated 
target price, U.S. farmers are encouraged to overproduce.3' 
Surpluses are then sold on world markets through export sub-
sidies provided under the Export Enhancement Program when 
the world price is below the U.S. target price. 
V. THE CHALLENGE 
The challenge of reforming agricultural trade is formidable. 
Food security is a powerful concept, particularly in countries 
that have experienced famine in the past fifty years. Farm 
lobbies are powerful in the EC, Japan, and the United States. 
The image of the rugged farmer pitted against the vagaries of 
the weather is evocative. Farmers are subject to the whims 
and caprices of weather and markets. Farmers must plant their 
crops and harvest them according to a fixed cycle that may 
not always coincide with the best time for selling their products. 
Prices and markets may conspire against them. And consumers 
and/ or voters want a stable supply of food at stable prices. 
But the gains to be achieved by shifting to a market-driven 
model of farming are no less formidable. If the law of com-
parative advantage was allowed to operate, farming would occur 
where production costs are lowest. The winners from farm-
trade liberalization would include the United States, Thailand, 
Turkey, India, .A..!"gentina, Brazil, Zambia, ~nd Zimbabwe.38 
Consumers, taxpayers, and the environment would be the im-
mediate beneficiaries. Consider the following figures. In 1989, 
agricultural subsidies and quotas cost EC taxpayers and con-
sumers $45 billion and $55 billion, respectively; Japanese tax-
payers and consumers $20 billion and over $50 billion, 
respectively; and American taxpayers and consumers $45 billion 
37. America's Farm Subsidies, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 21. 
38. Amy Kaslow, Farm Subsidies Create Bounty, Boondoggles, CmuSTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 4, 1992, at 12. 
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and $20 billion, respectively.39 In 1991, the United States and 
the EC together spent over $220 billion supporting their farm 
sector.40 In marked contrast, by 1992, Australia and New 
Zealand had phased out all farm subsidies.41 Clearly, where 
there is a political will, there is a political way. 
VI. RADICAL FARM REFORM As PART OF A TOTAL URUGUAY 
RoUND PACKAGE 
A fundamental axiom of free trade is "no pain, no gain." 
The prospects of successfully achieving lasting farm reform 
that is implemented gradually and not multilaterally are dim 
for at least two reasons. First, gradual reform is open to 
sniping from special interest groups who may wage a war of 
attrition to slow and eventually stall genuine reform. Second, 
farm reform that is not multilateral does not stand a good 
chance of defeating politically powerful farm lobbies. On the 
other hand, radical farm reforms that are multilateral, linked 
to trade reforms in non-farm sectors, and implemented against 
a backdrop of solid economic indicators offer the best hope 
for lasting reform with the least pain to farmers. Reforming 
agriculture radically on a multilateral basis and as part of a 
greater Uruguay Round trade reform package should mitigate 
the pain felt by farmers who are displaced by farm reforms. 
If countries cut farm subsidies simultaneously, world prices 
will rise and provide some cushion to farmers. In the United 
States farmers enjoy a comparative advantage in agriculture, 
so American farmers who want to continue to farm will be 
able to do so if radical farm reforms are adopted. In Europe 
and Japan, which do not enjoy a similar comparative advan-
tage, farmers are nevertheless close to alternative jobs outside 
of agriculture. If radical farm reforms are adopted as part of 
a total Uruguay Round package, then new jobs in services as 
well as manufacturing will be created to absorb European and 
Japanese farmers who suffer job dislocation as a result of 
39. Jones, supra note 34. 
40. Kaslow, supra note 38; at 9. 
41. ld. at 12. 
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farm reform. And if radical farm reforms are linked to a 
multilateral Uruguay Round trade package, it will become 
exceedingly difficult for farm lobbies to defeat farm reform' 
in their national legislatures. Politicians will be able to just 
say "no" to protectionism. 
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